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For over a decade, Scotland has implemented and operationalised a system of Safe Havens providing secure analytics platforms
for researchers to access linked, de-identified Electronic Health Records (EHRs) while managing the risk of unauthorised re-
identification. In this paper a perspective is provided on the state-of-the-art Scottish Safe Haven Network, including its evolution,
to define the key activities required to scale Scottish Safe Haven Network capability to facilitate research and healthcare
improvement initiatives. A set of processes related to EHR data and their delivery in Scotland are discussed. An interview with
each Safe Haven was conducted to understand their services in detail and the commonalities. The results present how Safe
Havens in Scotland have protected privacy while facilitating the reuse of the EHR data. This study provides a common definition
of a ‘Safe Haven’ and promotes a consistent understanding among the Scottish Safe Haven Network as well as the clinical and
academic research community. We conclude by identifying areas where efficiencies across the network can be made to meet the
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Abstract
For over a decade, Scotland has implemented and operationalised a system of Safe Havens providing
secure analytics platforms for researchers to access linked, de-identified Electronic Health Records
(EHRs) while  managing the risk of unauthorised re-identification.  In  this  paper  a  perspective is
provided on the state-of-the-art Scottish Safe Haven Network, including its evolution, to define the
key activities required to scale Scottish Safe Haven Network capability to facilitate research and
healthcare improvement initiatives.  A set of processes related to EHR data and their  delivery in
Scotland  are  discussed.  An interview with  each  Safe  Haven  was  conducted  to  understand  their
services in detail  and the commonalities. The results present how Safe Havens in Scotland have
protected  privacy  while  facilitating  the  reuse  of  the  EHR data.  This  study provides  a  common
definition of a ‘Safe Haven’ and promotes a consistent understanding among the Scottish Safe Haven
Network as well as the clinical and academic research community. We conclude by identifying areas
where efficiencies across the network can be made to meet the needs of population-level studies at
scale. 
Keywords: Electronic Health Records; Safe Haven; Data Governance 
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1 Introduction
Electronic Health Records (EHRs) are routinely collected data generated when an individual receives
care  in  a  health  care  setting.  EHRs  typically  contain  records  of  medical  history,  diagnoses,
medications, allergies, immunisations, and other treatments as well as laboratory results  [1]. The
records can be generated in different settings e.g. primary care facilities, such as clinics and health
care centres; secondary care facilities, such as hospitals and emergency care centres. Although the
primary  purpose  of  EHRs is  to  improve the  direct  care  of  patients,  they  also  have  some other
purposes that are termed ‘secondary use’ or ‘reuse’ [2]. Using EHR data in research is one such type
of secondary use [3, 4]. 
Safe Havens are secure environments that have been widely used to support access to EHRs for
research whilst protecting patient identity and privacy [5, 6]. The four Safe Havens collaborating as
part of the UK-wide Farr Institute were described by Lea et al [5] and were found to have different
processes,  controls  and  environments.  In  Scotland,  a  network  of  five  Safe  Havens  has  been
established to support EHR reuse and over the past decade, have enabled researchers to access data
at scale [6].
The Scottish Network of Safe Havens has been highly successful in supporting research. Over the
last 5 years, the network has supported over a thousand research studies. There are a small number
research  and  innovation  projects,  e.g.  iCAIRD  [7] and  Research  Data  Scotland  [8], which  are
collaborations across Safe Havens. The majority of research projects, however, are delivered by a
single Safe Haven. Each Safe Haven maintains and controls access to EHR data collected from their
geographically local regions and therefore has detailed knowledge of these datasets. The exception in
Scotland is the National Safe Haven (eDRIS) which holds national-level. Researchers generally only
access either the breadth of the nationally held data, with high cohort coverage, which are collected
at a Scottish level or the depth of the local clinical data which has more detailed information about
persons/entities from the Regional Safe Havens.
Representatives from each Safe Haven within the network meet regularly, supported and chaired by
the Scottish Government’s Chief Scientist Office (CSO). The Safe Havens collaborate to develop and
share  best  practices.  The  network  is  primarily  funded  on  a  cost-recovery  basis  by  charging
researchers for services, with some Safe Havens also receiving some core support from the National
Health Serivce (NHS) Scotland Research and Development funds.
This study provides an analysis of the infrastructure, operations and features of each Safe Haven and
assesses how these impact the interoperability and technical options to support multi-Safe Haven
projects. We present how Safe Havens in Scotland have protected privacy, as well as facilitating the
reuse of the EHR data. 
1.1 What is a Safe Haven?
Safe Havens have evolved as a set of processes to support researchers accessing sensitive data in a
streamlined and secure way maintaining patient confidentiality [5, 9, 10]. The term “Safe Haven” is a
widely used term but can have a different meaning to different people and in different contexts.
Barton et al [11] described in detail the origins and evolution of the term. A Safe Haven was defined
as ‘a repository in which useful but potentially sensitive data may be kept securely under governance
and informatics systems that are fit-for-purpose and appropriately tailored to the nature of the data
being  maintained,  and  may  be  accessed  and  utilised  by  legitimate  users  undertaking  work  and
research  contributing  to  biomedicine,  health  and/or  to  the  ongoing  development  of  healthcare
systems.’
In Scotland, the main goal of a Safe Haven  [5, 6] is to make data  (consented and  unconsented,
predominantly  unconsented  data) available  in  a  safe  and  secure  setting  for  approved  research
undertaken by approved researchers whilst mitigating risks such as re-identification of patients and
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unauthorised use. The controls Safe Havens implement assure data controllers and the public that the
data provided for analysis and research is securely managed and accessed. This reduces the risk to
organisations, such as the NHS, increasing their confidence in providing data for research purposes.
It also enhances public confidence in the use of their health data (NHS data) for research in the UK.
In addition, the standardised security across many research projects reduces the burden on individual
research groups to build, maintain, fund, and document such environments themselves. 
Researchers often require data from different sources. Data that might need to be linked to healthcare
data include social care, justice, education, research datasets or another NHS dataset. Data linkage is
the process of linking any two or more datasets on an individual or entity level [12]. 
 
Figure 1: Model of Scottish Safe Havens. Researchers have access to the Safe Haven application
process after data governance approvals. Safe Haven staff link and de-identify data and make them
available in the analytical platform for researchers to analyse. Please refer to Table 1 for Service
Network, Analytical Platform Network and Data Repository Network detail of each Scottish Safe
Haven.
Figure 1 provides a  model of how Scottish Safe Havens are  structured.  We have identified that
Scottish Safe Havens mainly offer the following services:
A Data Processor and/or Data Repository Management: Secure handling and linking of data
from  multiple  sources  and  possible  hosting/managing  of  longitudinal  data  (detailed
information about persons or entities, such as conditions, hospital admissions, prescription
data etc). Scottish Safe Havens can also provide the function of a “Trusted Third Party” [6,
13]. They can support linkage of identifiable information where the roles of “indexer” and
“linker” (see detail definition in Section 2.3) are separated so that no single organisation or
individual has visibility of another organisation's identifiable data linked to their descriptive
data [14, 15]. Safe Havens function as Data Processors [6] for any given dataset, and agree on
terms with each Data Controller (Safe Havens can also be the Data Controller) to ensure that
activities are centrally logged, monitored and audited [6].Analytical Platform: An analytical
platform  is  a  highly  secure,  high-performance  computing  virtual  and  high-performance
environment  that  enables  researchers  to  securely  analyse  data  without  the  row-level  de-
identified data leaving the environment (only aggregate level results can be exported). Strict
governance and controls are implemented to ensure data security in the analytical platform.
Research Support: The Safe Haven coordinators provide support to researchers navigating
the data requirements, permissions landscape and provide a review mechanism to share the
lessons from one project to the next. Some Scottish Safe Havens provide support for analysis.
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Internal Safe Haven data scientists can help the research group with statistical analysis.
The term “Safe Haven” is defined here to mean the overarching service that combines the above
services: A data processor and/or data repository, an analytics platform and research support.
The  Scottish Safe Havens follow the ‘Five Safes’ principles of  a Trusted Research Environment
(TRE): Safe People, Safe Project, Safe Setting, Safe Data and Safe Output [16] as described within
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Table 1: A summary table of Safe Haven propterties
Note: PHS: Public  Health Scotland; UoA: University of Aberdeen; NHS: National Health Service; UoD: University of Dundee; UoE: University of
Edinburgh; EPCC: Edinburgh Parallel Computing Centre; UoG: Univeristy of Glasgow; RCB: Robertson Centre For Biostatistics; PBPP: Public Benefit
And Privacy Panel; HSC PBPP: Public Benefit and Privacy Panel for Health and Social Care; Stats PBPP: Statistics Public Benefit and Privacy Panel;
NNPAC: North Node Privacy Advisory Committee; NDC: National Data Catalogue; RDMP: Research Data Management Platform; ICD: International
Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems; NSS: National Services Scotland; CHILI: CHI Linkage Team; BI: Business Intelligence
and Informatics; 
a When this work was done Lothian Safe Haven and DataLoch were separate (though closely partnered). Since 1st of April 2021, they merged into
Lothian/DataLoch Safe Haven.
b Regional Safe Havens have governance to request regional Health Board data. For example, Glasgow Safe Haven can request West of Scotland
Health Board data.
c Safe Havens have access to historic records for deceased patients, which can increase the accessible data. 
d TriNetX is a health research network tool that connects to assist drug discovery by helping pharmaceutical companies access clinical data. Glasgow
Safe Haven has a TriNetX node. For data mapped into TriNetX tool, their study feasibility can be done using TriNetX.
e COVID 19 data dictionary is on DataLoch website. 
1.2 Scottish Federated Network of Safe Havens 
The network of five Safe Havens operating in Scotland is accredited by the Scottish Government and
each Safe Haven adheres to the Scottish Safe Haven Charter  [6] Each offers the three services,
described in Section 1.1, with different data access procedures (subject to necessary local governance
approvals) applied to different data sources and with different standard operating procedures (SOPs).
There are four Regional Safe Havens and one National Safe Haven. There is a Regional Safe Haven
for  each  Research  and  Development  (R&D)  node  of  the  NHS  supported  by  the  Scottish
Government’s Chief Scientists Office [18]. They are provisioned by partnerships between the NHS
Boards  within  each R&D node and a  leading University  from the  region.  Whether  the  primary
contact organisation for a Safe Haven is an NHS board or a University differs between regional Safe
Havens (Table 1, rows ‘SH affiliation’ and ‘Analytical Platform Affiliation’ show the composition of
the partnerships for each Scottish Safe Haven). eDRIS [19], part of Public Health Scotland (PHS)
[20], commissions Edinburgh Parallel Computing Centre (EPCC) [21], University of Edinburgh to
provide the National Safe Haven. Grampian Data Safe Haven (DaSH) [22], a collaboration between
the  University  of  Aberdeen  and  NHS  Grampian,  is  the  Safe  Haven  for  the  Grampian  region
encompassing Aberdeen City, Aberdeenshire and Moray. The Health Informatics Centre (HIC) [23]
at the University of Dundee is covering the Tayside and Fife regions. The Glasgow [24] and Lothian/
DataLoch Safe Havens [25, 26] are led by the NHS, covering the west of Scotland, the Edinburgh
and  the  South  East  region,  working in  collaboration  with  Glasgow and Edinburgh Universities,
respectively. 
1.3 Scottish NHS Data Sources
Scotland has a single healthcare provider (NHS Scotland) and world-leading national health linked
data assets from birth to death. In high-level summary, the National Safe Haven has direct access to
health administrative data with high cohort coverage collected at a Scottish National level, and the
Regional  Safe  Havens  have  direct  access  to  more  detailed  health  data  from  clinical  systems.
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Regional Safe Havens can work closely with local data custodians, which gives them easy access to
additional data sources that are not routinely held, for example, other health data, educational data or
police data. Access to these other sources of data may require additional time, due to different access
processes and governance approvals. 
The Research Data Scotland initiative [27] has been set up to streamline and support access to linked
health and administrative datasets across the country. 
National level NHS data: 
PHS collect national level NHS [28] and adminstractive data to provide health information, health
intelligence, statistical services and advice to support the NHS in progressing quality improvement in
health and care, facilitate robust planning, and decision making. These datasets can be accessed in
the National Safe Haven. Each Health Board across Scotland provides a regular update of a subset of
their identifiable administrative data to PHS. This is standardised by PHS to create homogenous data
within  several  National  databases.  Such  data  includes  Scottish  Morbidity  Records  (SMR)  and
Community-dispensed prescriptions.  SMR data covers  several  different  datasets  such as  SMR00
(Hospital  Outpatient),  SMR01  (Acute  Stay  Hospital  Admissions),  SMR02  (Maternity),  SMR04
(Psychiatric  Returns),  SMR06  (Cancer  Registry),  SMR11  (Neonatal)  and  SMR25  (Substance
Misuse). National Records Scotland records births, marriages and deaths. 
Prescription data is collected nationally in two different ways. Through the ePharmacy system [29],
prescriptions written by General practitioners (GPs), are captured directly in the system. The long-
standing  Data  Capture  Validation  and Pricing  (DCVP) Paid  system  [30] is  used  in  Scotland  to
capture  dispensing  data  which  determines  remuneration  for  community  pharmacies.  The
‘watermarked’ prescriptions go from GP to the patient then to a pharmacy, and are then collected and
transferred monthly to DCVP/PHS for automated processing [31]. 
Regional level NHS data:
The Regional Safe Havens all receive a subset of the data from the National standardised datasets
(SMR, Prescribing data, etc.) from PHS which includes only the patients who are resident / received
healthcare within the relevant boards. They also have access to the deeply phenotyped data which is
captured within local clinical systems but not collected at a national level. For example, they have
access to microbiology data, virology data, laboratory test data, stroke data, echocardiology data etc.
The type and level of local data available differs between Safe Havens. Individuals in Scotland are
assigned a Community Health Index (CHI) number  [32] when they first interact with the Health
Service which is retained within their EHRs as much as possible throughout their health history.
Regional Safe Havens use CHIs to link datasets to the Nationally captured records for the population
within their region. 
Research data: 
In addition to unconsented access to routinely collected administrative/clinical records, the National
and Regional Safe Havens can also host or manage researcher-collected consented datasets  from
many sources such as clinical trials, patient questionnaires etc. Compared with routinely collected
EHRs, the research data often covers a narrower spectrum but provides more detailed information
about  the individual.  Participants  in research cohorts  are volunteers who have consented to data
access rules approved by ethics at the outset of the study. For example, Generation Scotland (GS)
[33] is a resource of human biological samples and data which are available for medical research to
create  more  effective  treatments  based  on  gene  knowledge  for  the  health,  social  and  economic
benefit of Scotland and its people. Another example is the SHARE [34] cohort which has consented
over 280,000 individuals recruited to allow genotyping of any remaining blood samples after routine
tests and applied to research upon their health data [34]. 
Regional Safe Havens also host disease-specific study data [35-40]. The data within these studies can
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be collected from a range of sources clinical data, patient surveys and routinely collected EHR data. 
Some  disease  registries  where  originally  created  at  a  regional  level  but  were  then  rolled  out
Nationally. For example, the SCI-Diabetes [41] disease registry was formed by curating and linking
routinely collected data from the Tayside Region. It was later developed into a nation-wide resource
which now also collects patient reported out-come data. The data collected in SCI-Diabetes is used in
clinical care. Extracts from SCI-Diabetes can also be linked on a study-by-study basis for research
studies by the regional or the National Safe Havens. 
Safe Havens can link research data to routinely collected administrative/clinical records and provide
access to the combined data (in a de-identified form) within a analytical platform for analysis. 
2 Scottish Safe Havens
Each Scottish Safe Haven has their data repository hosted on the NHS network (as shown in the
‘Data Repository Network’ row in Table 1), except for the National Safe Haven which also hosts
some  data  within  EPCC  on  a  secure  University  environment.  Safe  Havens  have  data-sharing
agreements with multiple data controllers and regularly receive new data from them. 
All Safe Havens have committed to an approach to data access based around analytical platforms.
Each Safe Haven has either established or has access to a analytical platform. 
There are differences between Safe Havens in how they achieve the three main services described in
Section 1.1. Table 1 summarises each Scottish Safe Haven. In the following section, we discuss the
Safe Havens’ in detail and their common deployment features.
2.1 Data governance and workflow
The governance approval step looks into aspects of the project such as ethics, peer review, funding
source,  public benefit  and adherence to the ‘Five Safes’ described in section 1.  The governance
approvals process varies from Safe Haven to Safe Haven. Even for the same Safe Haven, different
projects may require different governance approval processes in order to satisfy the different Data
Controllers.  However,  the  governance  process  for  a  standard  de-identified  project  where  data  is
accessed  in  an  analytical  platform  is  relatively  streamlined.  Each  Safe  Haven  has  a  delegated
governance  authority/committee,  as  shown  in  Table  1,  which  includes  representatives  from the
sponsor, ethics, lay members and NHS board to streamline the governance process and is relatively
fast.  For  the  DaSH  Safe  Haven,  projects  with  local  researchers  using  local  data  can  obtain
governance approval through their NNPAC process. The HIC Safe Haven’s‘standard projects’ (where
de-identified data is analysed by approved academic researchers within the analytical platform and
the  activity  is  funded  by a  peer-reviewed  research  grant)  are  covered  by  a  blanket  governance
approval.  The  list  of  the  standard  projects  supported  is  provided  to  the  relevant  governance
committee for  information rather  than a  request  for approval  for each one prior  to  the research
commencing.  For  Lothian/DataLoch,  projects  involving  de-identified  data  within  an  analytical
platform can obtain governance approval through their local Data Access Committee process, which
includes delegated Caldicott review.
Most Safe Haven responses to project requests adhere to a standard set of processes e.g. de-identified
linked  data  is  provided  within  a  analytical  platform  for  academic  research.  In  exceptional
circumstances, some projects require a different model and such exceptions need to be justified to
obtain governance approvals. Example exceptions include: (a) the prepared project data would not be
placed in a analytical platform; (b) the project data has some identifiable information. 
To work on identifiable EHR data within a data repository, Safe Haven staff members are either NHS
employees or have honorary NHS contracts.  Safe Havens all  have rule-based segregation of the
team, specifying those with and without access to identifiable data. Only a handful of people in each
Safe  Haven  can  access  the  NHS  network  and  see  identifiable  data.  Other  data  sources  (e.g.
administrative data generated by the government or research data generated by research institutions)
can be linked to EHRs. The linkage is performed by the Safe Haven data linkage team, and the
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linked data sets are then hosted in the analytical platform for the approved researchers/investigators
to access. At each stage there is an oversight step to ensure all procedures were correctly followed
and no unintentional identifiable data is released.
Figure 2: Safe Haven Project Workflow describes the stages a Safe Haven takes to support a typical
project. (1) data discovery and research feasibility, users will initialise the application on the data
governance aspects; (2) (Optionally) index and link a research dataset or administrative/clinical
dataset for hosting at a given analytical platform; (3) cohort building the selected/agreed data from
Safe Haven datasets; (4) transfer of extracted data to analytical platform after the data governance
has been checked; user analyses analytical platform dataset. The project dataset is archived at the
end of the project.
The project workflow for a data request is consistent across the Safe Haven network as shown in
Figure 2. In the first  step, the Safe Haven team runs research feasibility queries to identify data
needed for the research topic. Once funding and governance is in place, data linkage is conducted (as
required).  Data  extracted  from  the  NHS  network  is  de-identified,  validated  and  assessed  for
disclosure before being released into the analytical platform. Details of linking and de-identification
are given in Section 2.3 and Section 2.4. Section 2.5 provides discussions on the analytical platform
support and data support. The archiving procedure of each Safe Haven and the infrastructures of each
Safe Havens’ data repository are discussed in Section 2.6. 
2.2 Data discovery and metadata
Research  feasibility  analysis  and data  discovery  remain  a  manual  process  involving discussions
between  researchers  and  the  Safe  Haven  teams.  During  the  project  planning  stage,  researchers
contact the relevant Safe Haven by email/phone call. Data discovery and research feasibility is done
by document exchange and/or a face to face/virtual  meeting.  Safe Havens in  Scotland require a
meeting  to  capture  the  requirements  of  each  study  as  well  as  guiding  the  governance  process.
Research feasibility is conducted by the Safe Haven by generating aggregate numbers for cohort/sub-
cohort sizes based on the requirements defined by the researcher(s). For example, how many people
are there in the data with diabetes who are over the age of 65 and who regularly have a prescription
for insulin?
Researchers normally specify a phenotype or public phenotype algorithms to identify the correct
cohort for their study. As shown in Table 1, no common standard procedure exists among the five
Safe  Havens  to  capture  and  reuse  phenotype  algorithms.  However,  DataLoch  also  uses  the
CALIBER phenotype library [42] while the Glasgow Safe Haven uses a suite of local matrix files
storage phenotype algorithms, based on standard or published methods, which have been quality
checked by clinicians. eDRIS, as they mainly work on national datasets using the ICD standard [43],
usually agree what the ICD codes are with the researcher and conduct the cohort building using the
codes as well as any date or other constraints given by the researcher. The remaining Safe Havens –
HIC and DaSH - normally rely on the researcher to define the cohort themselves, where researchers
have the choice of phenotype definition, for example, CALIBER phenotypes or ICD codes. Cohort
identification is sometimes an iterative process between researchers and the Safe Haven team where
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a data constraint is applied, the impact on cohort size is observed and the constraint adjusted to
optimise the cohort. 
At the national-level PHS produces a National Data Catalogue (NDC)  [44] as a single definitive
resource of information on Scottish Health and Social Care datasets to assist cohort discovery. 
Metadata provides the semantics associated with the Safe Haven datasets. There is, limited visibility
of the metadata and data provenance available from Regional Safe Havens. The majority of the Safe
Havens list the names of their easily accessible databases online [20, 22, 24-26, 45, 46] and provide
researchers with a brief overview of the most commonly accessed datasets. Both HIC and eDRIS add
their metadata and datasets to the HDR Innovation Gateway [47]. There is no common structure in
EHR data storage across the healthcare system in Scotland. Since only a limited number of data
scientists/analyst have experience in handling NHS data, this lack of visibility of metadata and data
provenance can lead to a gap in understanding by data scientists/analyst about what data is available.
Some Safe Havens will only release detailed metadata once they have an initial understanding of the
project’s needs. There are multiple initiatives both internal [7, 48, 49] and external [8, 47] looking to
improve the metadata visibility within Scottish Network of Safe Havens.
Research projects benefit from having clinical investigators who are familiar with NHS data or data
scientists/analysts who have previous experience of working on Safe Haven projects within their
project team. Such individuals can help to identify what data are available and to advise and support
the  data  scientists/analysts  working on  the  project.  The  majority  Safe  Haven  projects  generally
require  a  suitable  sponsor  with  relevant  expertise  to  take  responsibility  for  the  initiation  and
management of the project and to support the project as an ethical safeguard. 
All five Safe Havens provide research projects with metadata at the field level once a project is
funded,  approved  and  data  extracts  provided  for  analysis.  However,  feasibility  discussions  will
generally take place at the ‘conceptual’ level. For example, a cohort definition may involve a fasting
glucose constraint.  The Safe Haven team will  confirm that such a constraint is possible without
disclosing the precise fields. To avoid bias and to get researchers to articulate what they need, and
what is available, this ‘conceptual’ level feasibility can be quite limiting. The same could be true of
the data extract requested, delivering BMI rather than height and weight for example. However, data
extraction and delivery is generally at the field level and field-level metadata is be provided to ensure
researchers can perform their analyses. 
 Table 1 shows that eDRIS provides metadata details on its website metadata (like the Cribsheet [50]
on SMR)  which can be used by researchers to define the fields they need when applying for data
access. The researchers using the Regional Safe Havens can also utilise this metadata information for
the nationally standardised datasets which the Regional Safe Havens hold for the subset of their
region e.g. SMR data. None of the Safe Havens provide non-field-based metadata, such as through
an ontology. 
The eDRIS Safe Haven does not provide bespoke metadata to the user when delivering the project
data.  DaSH and HIC Safe Havens have a  standard workflow and delivery format  for supplying
project  specific  metadata  to  each  project.  In  the  Glasgow  and  Lothian/Dataloch  Safe  Havens,
projects are provided with all available metadata and provenance information. No standard format is
used, and so the information included varies from project to project. 
Safe Havens have different approaches to storing metadata about datasets in their data repositories.
For eDRIS, PHS updates and maintains the National Data Catalogue which contains all the metadata
for national datasets. The HIC Safe Haven uses an in-house, open-source software tool called the
Research Data Management Platform (RDMP) [13] for importing data into their servers. The RDMP
generates  consistently  formatted  metadata  for  imported  datasets.  Lothian/Dataloch  Safe  Haven
provides ‘data dictionaries’, which include metadata, for all the datasets in their Relational Database
Management System (RDBMS). The Glasgow Safe Haven and the DaSH Safe Haven have internal
document spaces to host the metadata and provenance provided by various data sources, which get
manually entered and updated by staff.The lack of standard procedures in the Scottish Safe Haven
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Network, has resulted in the available metadata varying between datasets. Highly processed datasets
which have gone through Extract, Transform and Load (ETL) procedures have field parameters and
rules imposed on them. These datasets have rich metadata associated with them. The majority of
clinical data, however, is inherently of variable quality, with poor coverage, inconsistent and missing
fields. The dataset metadata does not typically inform the user of the data variability or quality issues
in the original data.
2.3 Data linkage
To answer many research questions, data linkage is required to enrich information about a defined
cohort. Some Safe Haven projects involve linking NHS data with non-NHS data. Figure 3 illustrates
the Indexing and Linking services in the Scotland Safe Haven Network. 
According to the Guiding Principles of Data Linkage  [51], an  Indexer is an “Individual (or body)
who receives personal data from one or more Data Controllers and determines which records in each
dataset relate to the same individual (or entity). The indexer creates a unique reference for each
individual (or entity) and a corresponding key to allow the data from the different sources to be
joined.” Thus, an Indexing service [51] returns a unique identifier for each individual given an input
dataset of identifying information e.g. name, address, date of birth, and other operational identifiers
(such as  CHI number).  The relationship  between identifiers  associated  with  multiple  datasets  is
maintained by the Indexing service. The Indexing service does not have visibility of the descriptive
data pertaining to any individual (also termed payload data) e.g. an individual’s hospital admission
information. 
A Linker/Linking Service is an “Individual (or body) who receives datasets from data controllers and
links them together using a key created by the indexer.”  [51].  In this way, only output identifiers
from the indexer service are exposed to the linker; only the linking service and the researchers see
the linked data [14].
Figure 3: Data indexing and linking services in Scotland.
In Scotland, the NHS maintains the CHI. This is a patient identifier which concatenates a unique
number, the person’s data of birth and their sex. CHI numbers are allocated at birth or on the first
contact with the NHS in Scotland  [32, 52]. Linking health data to other data where both datasets
already  contain  CHI  number  is  straightforward.  All  four  Regional  Safe  Havens  do  this  when
preparing data for placement in a analytical platform using either software tools (HIC use RDMP
[13] for example) or RDBMS user interfaces. 
The National Safe Haven, eDRIS, established a data indexing and linkage procedure [17], the input
identifiers  are  personal  identifiers  and  the  output  identifier  is  an  anonymised  ID. eDRIS  only
receives data from providers with anonymised IDs and acts as Linker, placing the integrated data into
a secure environment.
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CHI Seeding
When linking to a source dataset that does not have CHI numbers but features other identifiers, the
indexing team will use ‘Probabilistic Matching’ against the Population Spine. Related to the CHI, the
Population Spine [17] contains the personal identifiers of all individuals in Scotland who have been
in contact with NHS Scotland. This process of matching source datasets to the Population Spine is
known as ‘CHI seeding’. The recent seeding of regional social care systems with CHI is an example
of this. CHI seeding is also important for historical data analysis for EHRs prior to the introduction
of  CHI indexing.  In  Scotland,  two teams  provide  national-level  CHI  seeding using  probability-
matching:  the  National  Records  Scotland (NRS) Indexing Team and the Public  Health  Scotland
(PHS) CHI Linkage Team (CHILI). When a research project only needs NHS data indexing would be
carried out by CHILI. 
Both eDRIS and Lothian Safe Havens rely on NRS/CHILI for CHI seeding.  DaSH Safe Haven
provides CHI seeding through the NRS Scotland indexing team; they will  only do it  themselves
when they have specific personal identifiers available such as patient name and the dataset consists
of only a small amount of local Grampian patient records (approximately 500 people). Glasgow and
HIC Safe Havens have a more established probabilistic matching routine developed, and normally do
CHI seeding themselves. HIC has worked with local authorities to CHI seed their non-health data to
be able to link it to health data.
2.4 Data de-identification
De-identification is undertaken before a Safe Haven provides the data to a analytical platform for the
researcher to access. De-identification replaces information that could identify an individual in a data
set with a study identifier (ID) for that individual and specific to that study, or dilutes the identifier to
remove its individual nature. In linked, de-identified datasets the study ID is the same across data
sources enabling researchers to link these data sources and understand which data corresponds to the
same individual  within  that  study,  but  without  knowing their  identity.  This  also means that  de-
identified IDs are unique to that project so the same individual will have different IDs in different
projects. 
In  general,  Safe  Havens  apply  consistent  rules  to  identifiable  data  fields.  Customising  de-
identification rules based on the bespoke project requirements, governance approvals and the variety
of datasets  can be  accommodated.  The treatment of identifiers depends on the project’s  specific
justification  following  data  minimisation  principles  [51].  For  example,  a  date  of  birth  can  be
processed to the 1st of the month or can be replaced with ‘age-at’, or it can be removed if it is not
considered necessary for the analysis. A postcode can be replaced with a deprivation score, a SIMD
rank [53], or it can be removed from the data. For biometric data, where, for example, weight and
height of the individual are included, Safe Havens often put such values into ranges.  Each Safe
Haven  follows  Standard  Operation  Procedures  (SOP)  for  reproducibility,  consistency  and  error
reduction. 
All  Safe Havens indicated  that  they  find  it  challenging to  de-identify  clinical  reports  and other
documents containing free text, which often contain personal identifiers such as phone numbers and
names. Safe Havens often exclude entire fields from research extracts when they are not confident
that  such  fields  are  safe  to  release.  iCAIRD  [7] is  using  hidden  in  plain  sight  techniques  for
identifiable  data  on  images.  eDRIS  has  developed  algorithms  to  remove  Personal  Identifying
Information (PII) from the Dose Instructions in PIS (these can also extract structured information e.g.
dose  unit  and  frequency).  As  part  of  the  Scottish  Medical  Imaging  (SMI)  service  [54] and
PICTURES [55] there is work in progress to de-identify and create metadata from the text written by
radiologists  on  their  findings.  This  uses  Natural  Language  Processing  (NLP)  and  the  CogStack
framework [56].
2.5 Data formats in the analytical platform
In general, Safe Havens make few changes to source data provided to researchers, these changes
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being limited to the process of de-identification. For example, there is no attempt to harmonise data
through the transformation of diagnosis codes or drug codes, where significant versioning occurs in
longitudinal data. Some Safe Havens do add derived data to datasets. Within HIC for example, these
data derivations and transforms can be applied either  within the Safe Haven,  or at  the point  of
extracting a de-identified research dataset. This is done using RDMP, an open-source solution that
allows custom coding, or researcher created statistics package code to be executed in a repeatable
and reproducible manner. When requested by the researcher, DaSH Safe Haven can provide Charlson
Comorbidity Index [57] and Tonelli codes  [58] alongside ICD codes. While data standards are not
applied at data extraction and delivered to a analytical platform, standards are enforced for nationally
captured datasets. A team in PHS works with the health boards and system suppliers to ensure the use
of standards. e.g. SMR data must be structured in an agreed way and use agreed coding systems for
content. 
Safe Havens make their best efforts to accommodate the requirements of projects. However, software
available in most analytical platforms is limited (Microsoft Office packages, SPSS [59], Stata [60],
SAS [61], R [62] etc), and so the output data formats are also limited to R, Excel, SPSS files or Stata
files. The exception is the recently launched HIC hybrid cloud-based, scalable analytical platform.
This  also  includes  the  capability  for  software  development,  machine  learning  and  artificial
intelligence development including, for example, python  [63], MATLAB [64], and a suite of tools
within Jupyter Notebooks (Sagemaker instance)  [65] such as TensorFlow. The environment is also
being enhanced to support multi-omic data  [66] analysis through pipelines, utilising tools such as
Plink  [67] and Nexflow  [68] with resource  scheduling through AWS Batch  [69].  The analytical
platform provides GPUs and high-performance computing capabilities. 
For larger projects, where the number of rows is too high to manage in other formats, the HIC Safe
Haven provides the data in an RDBMS in the analytical platform for use by researchers.
Researchers rely upon Safe Havens to archive the raw data and derived data products from their
analysis since they're not permitted to export any of that data from an analytical platform. A research
project may be archived for a period of between 5 and 30 years depending on regulations, researcher
or funder requirements. Archival typically takes place using the analytical platform infrastructure.
There can be significant costs for storing and securing large amounts of data and a policy for long-
term archival is being jointly developed by the Scottish Safe Havens.
2.6 Data repository infrastructure
Safe Havens have their source EHRs on the NHS network which is transferred to the service network
(where the cohort building and linkage takes place, please refer to Figure 1) when required. They
create cohorts and associated data on the NHS infrastructure before the data goes through the Safe
Haven functions of linkage, de-identification and transfer to analytical platform(s) for researchers to
access.  The  exception  is  eDRIS  who  have  some  datasets  managed  securely  on  a  university
environment by EPCC. 
The infrastructure and the ETL process for those data repositories vary between Safe Havens (Figure
4).
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Figure 4: Safe Havens’ data repository networks. Upper row from left to right: eDRIS, HIC and
Glasgow Safe Haven. The lower row from left to right: Lothian, DataLoch and DaSH Safe Haven.
As shown in Table 1, ‘Data Repository No.’ row, eDRIS has access to 85 national NHS datasets;
these are updated and maintained by PHS. There are datasets that eDRIS cannot access routinely but,
for a known cohort, they can request data from other teams within PHS. The data management team
within PHS perform quality assurance after ETL using R or SPSS (in cases of legacy data). As well
as  providing  data  to  eDRIS,  the  data  are  also  used  to  run  hundreds  of  different  reports  and
publications by other teams within PHS.
HIC’s data repository infrastructure and NHS Tayside/Fife data are co-located within the same data
centre. HIC run University of Dundee owned and managed servers connected to the NHS Tayside
network  and  receive  regular  feeds  of  data  from  NHS  Tayside  clinical  systems  and  from  PHS
(covering  consented  cohorts  of  research  data  and  for  the  patients  within  the  Tayside  and  Fife
regions). The RDMP tool takes data from the feeds and performs ETL to clean and transform the
data which are then stored within structured databases.
Glasgow Safe Haven’s data repository mirrors some data from the routine data systems that are
maintained by Business Intelligence and Informatics (BI) in NHS Glasgow. For custom NHS data or
data collected for research projects, e.g. some SMR, PIS, all audit data, device data, trial data etc,
Glasgow Safe Haven staff will conduct the ETL themselves. 
Lothian/DataLoch data repositories residing on the NHS Lothian IT infrastructure use stored Python/
SQL to load data updates from PHS and data feeds via Business Intelligence and Informatics (BI)
within NHS Lothian for copies of data from local clinical systems.
NHS Grampian’s Health Intelligence Team updates the DaSH Safe Haven repository monthly. Both
Lothian/DataLoch and DaSH Safe Haven deal with changing data formats by separating new and old
data.
3 Discussion
Scotland has many strengths regarding enabling EHRs for reuse. There is a single National Health
Service where patients are allocated CHI numbers which can be used to link their whole patient
history. The Scottish Network of Safe Havens have similar architectures, adhere to the Scottish Safe
Haven Charter [6], are accredited by the Scottish Government and ISO27001 [70, 71] is the common
information security standard. Each Regional Safe Haven has a rich and deep data source from their
local health boards, and the National Safe Haven has the breadth of a whole-population view and
close  links  to  other  health  and social  care  data  sources.  Scotland has  many strengths  regarding
enabling EHRs for reuse. There is a single National Health Service where patients are allocated CHI
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numbers which can be used to link their whole patient history. 
All the Safe Havens make use of two networks: 1) a analytical platform set up within university
managed networks and 2) data repositories set up mainly on NHS networks. The existing operational
separation of source data repository, linkage infrastructure and analytical platform, provides a solid
foundation for increasing collaborative work across national and multi-Safe Haven projects. 
There  are  some  barriers,  as  highlighted  Section  2,  to  making  multi-Safe  Haven  projects  as
streamlined as possible. Addressing them in coordinated manner would pave the way to achieving a
federated system of Safe Havens in Scotland. These opportunities for improvement include: 
 Data visibility: The depth of the Scottish Data, which is hosted by Regional Safe Havens
(described in Section 1.3), is not widely utilised by the wider community. These datasets are
unique to each Regional Safe Haven and are difficult to bring up to a consistent national
level.  Interactions  with  researchers  for  feasibility,  generating  aggregate  numbers,  scoping
projects,  providing  quotes  for  work  can  be  resource  intensive.  Many  data  requests  to
Regional Safe Havens are from frequent users who know well the specific data structures and
terminologies  used  by  each  Safe  Haven.  In  making  the  regional  data  more  visible  and
accessible,  researchers  will  be  more  able  to  run  projects  using  data  from multiple  Safe
Havens. 
 Data standards and common data models: As shown in Table 1, the Safe Havens accept data
which uses any of number of standards. Due to the processing efficiency, the “create and
destroy” model mandated by the Safe Haven Charter and the fact that researchers normally
prefer to have the original data, there has been little attempt to harmonise extracted data for
placement in analytical platforms. If the use of common data models such as OMOP [72] and
i2b2 star  schema  [73] were used,  either  for  data  repositories  or  analytical  platforms,  the
burden on multi-Safe Haven projects would be reduced and operational access to data would
be faster and more predictable.
 Governance: In  the  Safe  Haven  Network,  access  to  linked  data  is  fragmented  with
researchers  and  healthcare  providers  having  to  work  with  Safe  Havens  to  obtain  local,
regional or national data controller’s approval. Data governance in general is much easier at a
local level. At Scottish national level, application forms for submission to the Public Benefit
and Privacy Panel for Health and Social Care (HSC-PBPP) and Statistics Public Benefit and
Privacy Panel (Stats PBPP) are normally required. This is a complex process and can take
significant time for review and approval. 
With the experience and knowledge gained from supporting projects  requiring diverse local  and
regional  datasets  [74,  75];  and to  build capability  for  a  federated network,  we propose  that  the
following aspects of the network be addressed in future research: 
 The  establishment  of  a  shared  method  for  cataloguing  and  managing  metadata  would
facilitate data discovery and research feasibility.  
 To  facilitate  cross  Safe  Haven  data  governance,  standardising  the  application  interface
specifications  to  Safe  Havens  would  permit  easier  cross-access  of  Safe  Havens  by
researchers. 
 Healthcare  delivery  is  explicitly  devolved to  local  structures  via  Health  and Social  Care
Partnerships in Scotland and associated legislation.  With functions devolved to individual
Health Boards, the linking of regional available data will require greater collaboration across
the organisations and appropriate benefit shares. 
4 Conclusions
The Safe Haven network in Scotland has supported over a thousand projects in the past 5 years,
underpinning world class research outputs. It not only brought grant research, jobs and funding to
Scotland but also enables international health research with many countries such as Brazil, India etc. 
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This paper reports an operational assessment of each of four Regional Safe Havens and the National
Safe Haven. We compared a set of functions and services related to data forming part of EHRs in
Scotland.  We have described the operation of Scottish Safe Haven data services and functions and
their technical implementation from the following points of view: (1) data governance and workflow;
(2) data discovery and metadata; (3) data linkage; (4) data de-identification; (5) analytical platforms;
and (6) data repository infrastructure. The results obtained should assist the Scottish Safe Havens to
scale operations to larger cohorts and more diverse data, reduce timescales and operate more cost-
effectively.  More importantly,  this  work identified the responsibilities and work needed for each
Scottish Safe Haven to contribute to the building of a national federated data-sharing platform. While
this  paper  has  focused  on  experiences  across  Scotland,  the  findings  will  be  of  interest
nationally/internationally to inform understanding of the challenges that exist for the re-use of EHR
data in clinical and other kinds of research.
Abbreviations
CHI community health index
COPD chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
DaSH Grampian data Safe Haven
eDRIS Scottish National Safe Haven
EHRs electronic health records
ETL extract, transform, load
GP general practitioner
HIC Health Informatics Centre





relational database management system
NHS national health service
PHS Public Health Scotland
R&D research and development
SMR Scottish Morbidity Records
TRE trusted research environment
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Model of Scottish Safe Havens. Researchers have access to the Safe Haven application process after data governance
approvals. Safe Haven staff link and de-identify data and make them available in the analytical platform for researchers to
analyse. Please refer to Table 1 for Service Network, Analytical Platform Network and Data Repository Network detail of each
Scottish Safe Haven.
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Safe Haven Project Workflow describes the stages a Safe Haven takes to support a typical project. (1) data discovery and
research feasibility, users will initialise the application on the data governance aspects; (2) (Optionally) index and link a
research dataset or administrative/clinical dataset for hosting at a given analytical platform; (3) cohort building the
selected/agreed data from Safe Haven datasets; (4) transfer of extracted data to analytical platform after the data governance has
been checked; user analyses analytical platform dataset. The project dataset is archived at the end of the project.
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Data indexing and linking services in Scotland.
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Safe Havens’ data repository networks. Upper row from left to right: eDRIS, HIC and Glasgow Safe Haven. The lower row
from left to right: Lothian, DataLoch and DaSH Safe Haven.
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